Security of MBAN based Health Records in Mobile Broadband Environment  by Acharya, Debopam & Kumar, Vijay
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877–0509 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Prof. Elhadi Shakshuki and Prof. Muhammad Younas.
doi:10.1016/j.procs.2011.07.070
Procedia Computer Science 5 (2011) 539–545
The 8th International Conference on Mobile Web Information Systems 
Security of MBAN based Health Records in  
Mobile Broadband Environment 
Debopam Acharyaa, Vijay Kumarb 
aDepartment of Computer Sciences, Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA 30460,USA
bSchool of Computing and Engineering, University of Missouri, Kansas City, MO 64110, USA 
Abstract 
Strong developments in mobile computing and web systems within the last decade have led to their integration in different 
aspects of our life. This has enabled us to explore new possibilities in the healthcare sector in the form of real time health 
monitoring and diagnosis systems. Mobile broadband technologies like WiMAX and LTE are being introduced at a rapid pace. 
This will lead to the development of healthcare systems involving round-the-clock mobile health monitoring, high volume data 
transmission for remote tests and diagnosis and other real time applications. There are several security issues that should be 
addressed to enable secured medical data transfer in a mobile broadband environment. In this work, we identify all such security 
issues and vulnerabilities involving transmission of medical data and propose a security scheme to address some of these issues.   
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1. Introduction
Rapid advances in mobile and wireless technologies have led to the development of smart, user preference-
oriented and context-aware devices. In the near future, wireless sensors will be fully integrated in clothing, 
appliances, and vehicles and in every place we can imagine. An important area involving use of wireless sensors is 
mobile and pervasive healthcare [1]. Most of these wireless health sensors use Bluetooth wireless communication to 
form a personal area network. Others connect to wireless local area network and transfer data to a central device. 
The fractured market of wireless healthcare devices with no major standardized platform (except Bluetooth) is 
affecting the growth of the mobile health industry. To provide a common platform, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in the United States of America has recently proposed to allocate radiofrequency spectrum 
exclusively for medical sensors and establish service and technical rules for the operation of Medical Body Area 
Network (MBAN) Systems [2]. The FCC envisions that MBANs would provide a platform for wireless networking 
of multiple body sensors to monitor physiological data. The use of MBANs would help eliminate the need for 
hardwired, patient-attached cables used by current monitoring technologies. The FCC’s proposal is a continuation of 
its efforts to satisfy the spectrum requirements of wireless medical technologies. Some of the bands proposed by 
FCC are 2300-2305 MHz, 2360-2400 MHz and 2400-2483.5 MHz Band. MBAN could be created through attaching 
multiple miniature wireless sensors on our body. These sensors would take readings of key information such as 
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temperature, pulse, blood glucose level, blood pressure, respiratory function, and a variety of other physiological 
metrics. These data will be wirelessly transmitted to a hub device placed at a short distance which would then relay 
the data to a central facility (like call center) for further processing, diagnosis and storage. Hence, increased 
availability and miniaturization of wireless sensors under a common platform will help the healthcare industry move 
out from existing wired telemedicine systems based monitoring to more advanced MBAN based mobile healthcare 
management (MHM).  
 
Mobile broadband technology is currently being standardized with mobile Wireless Interoperability for 
Microwave Access (WiMAX) [8] already deployed in major cities. Another upcoming standard is the Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) [10] and efforts are on to standardize it before rolling it out to different markets by 2011-2012. The 
mobile WiMAX (IEEE 802.16e standard) comes from IEEE family of protocols and extends the wireless access 
from the Local Area Network (typically based on the IEEE 802.11 standard) to Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN) 
and Wide Area Networks (WAN). It uses a new physical layer radio access technology called OFDMA (Orthogonal 
Frequency Division Multiple Access) for uplink and downlink. The LTE defines a new physical layer radio access 
technology based on Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) for the downlink, similar in 
concept to the physical layer of Mobile WiMAX, but uses single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-
FDMA) for the uplink. We argue that a MBAN created by using standardized wireless healthcare sensors together 
with 4G technologies like mobile WiMAX will help create a robust and efficient MHM system. To achieve this, 
there are several issues that should be addressed. One of the most important issues is security of health data/records 
collected and transmitted in the wireless environment. In this work, we identify security threats and vulnerabilities 
of such data in a 4G based MHM system.   
 
The rest of the paper paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the architecture of MHM system. We 
identify and address various security/authentication threats involving such a system in section 3. Section 4 describes 
a possible solution to some these threats that we will address in our future work. Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Architecture of MHM System 
4G technologies have the potential to revolutionize healthcare management. We present one such MHM 
architecture involving 4G technologies in Fig. 1. MBAN sensors and patches can be attached to the body that 
collects real time physiological data. A 4G smart phone collects these data and creates an electronic healthcare 
record (EHR). Its transfers the EHR to a web server kept in a call centre. The call centre monitors physiological 
data, sends alerts if necessary and frequently multicasts context aware health education modules containing 
preventive healthcare techniques. The call centre may send abnormal physiological data for further tests and results 
are then sent to a physician for further diagnosis. The physician can diagnose current results and access patient’s 
electronic medical record (EMR) to accurately identify the problem. The results are sent back to the patient. The 
patient may choose to contact the physician for an audio/video consultation. Based on the consultation, the physician 
may prescribe medicines with the help of an electronic prescription that can be downloaded by the patient in his/her 
smart phone. The patient sends the prescription to the pharmacy and pick up the drugs at a later time according to 
his/her convenience. This preventive action and timely consultation will be extremely beneficial to the patient, 
hospitals and insurance agencies [3]. If the physician diagnoses an emergency condition, he relays the message to 
the call centre which in turn notifies it to emergency services for prompt action. The call centre may also send alerts 
to patient’s relatives and friends about the emergency situation.  
 
2.1 Difference between an EHR and an EMR 
 
It is important to distinguish between an EMR and an EHR to identify the security risks associated with them [4]. 
An EMR is the legal record of clinical services for patient encounters in a care delivery organization (CDO) and 
owned by the CDO with non-interactive patient access. This can only be accessed either by the CDO or by a 
medical practitioner. EHR is a subset of each CDO's EMR and owned/accessed by the patient. Also, whenever a 
patient collects physiological data and transfers it to a server, it is stored as an EHR. The EMR is created in a CDO. 
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Fig. 1 Mobile Healthcare Management (MHM) Architecture 
 
It is the source of data for the EHR. The advantage of EHR is that it can be shared and made available wherever 
(patients, healthcare providers, insurance, government, etc.) it is needed. 
 
3. Security of Medical/Health Records 
Security of medical/health records is a serious issue. Precisely, this involves security and privacy of EMR access 
by physicians or CDO and EHR access by patient using 4G wireless networks. 4G Healthcare Systems may involve 
medical data transmission as follows: (a) Physiological data transmission between MBAN sensors and a 4G mobile 
unit (MU); (b) Data transfer between MU and a web server. This will involve physiological data transmission and 
EHR access; (c) Data transfer from web server to Physician for diagnosis (patient’s EMR access); (d) Audio/Video 
Consultation and electronic prescription transfer between patient and physician. (a)'s data transmission is in a 
MBAN and rest may involve data transmission in a 4G network. Each of these sections faces several threats and 
vulnerabilities as shown in Fig. 2.  
 
 
3.1 Security issues in MBAN 
Security attacks to health data collected in MBAN can be classified into two types: Active and Passive attacks. 
Active attacks are made by adversaries who have the capability to eavesdrop on medical data traffic inside MBAN. 
Adversaries can inject malicious messages and replay old messages. They can also set up spoof nodes in or around 
MBAN to become a part of the network. Unintentional flooding of connection requests by foreign nodes may also 
prevent the host node to connect to other nodes in the MBAN. All these are Denial of Services (DOS) attacks that 
not only compromise patient’s private medical data but can also substitute/modify legitimate medical data with 
bogus messages into the network. This can lead to catastrophic consequences such as preventing notification to 
medical services/hospitals in case of emergency. Passive attacks are made by adversaries who only have the 
capability to eavesdrop on the communication inside MBAN without interfering with the functionality of it. The 
attackers can compromise patient’s privacy by performing crypt-analytical attacks on the eavesdropped medical data 












         
 
Fig. 3 Initial Network Entry Procedure by a Mobile Unit 
 
 
3.2 Security issues associated with health records in WiMAX 4G network 
Security issues in WiMAX involve vulnerabilities in Data Link (DL) layer and connection based security 
protocols, authentication threats, and weak security mechanisms in 4G devices. We discuss them in the subsections 
below. 
 
3.2.1 Vulnerabilities of WiMAX in the Data Link layer 
Mobile WiMAX has vital security flaws in the MAC sub layer. The initial network entry procedure is very 
important since it is the first step to establish a connection in Mobile WiMAX.  It is performed by taking several 
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steps such as (a) initial Ranging process, (b) MU Basic Capability negotiation, (c) Privacy Key Management (PKM) 
authentication and (d) registration process. The initial network entry procedure is shown in Fig. 3. In this procedure 
[5, 9], when a 4G MU enters the network to upload health data, it scans the downlink channel and synchronizes with 
it. In this downlink, the WiMAX base station (BS) announces the initial ranging code for the MU. One of these 
codes is selected by the MU. This is sent back to BS for initial ranging. The BS station then responds back by 
sending a Ranging-Response (RNG-RSP) message. The next step involves MU basic capability negotiation process. 
These steps are performed by initiating multiple management (request-response) messages. These management 
messages are unencrypted and hence the attacker can eavesdrop on these messages, modify them, and send them 
back to the MU or the BS. The attacker can also modify the RNG-RSP messages, set the connection status as failed 
and re send it back to the MU. The MU will see this as a failure to establish connection, and will go for the initial 
ranging process again. The attacker may continue this Man in the Middle (MITM) attack through modification of 
RNG-RSP messages leading to complete denial of services (DoS) to the MU. 
  
  
3.2.2 Authentication Threats in WiMAX 
Mobile WiMAX is vulnerable to masquerading threat in which an attacker assumes the identity of the legitimate 
MU. There are two techniques to perform this type of attack, (a) Identity theft and (b) Rogue BS attack. In identity 
thefts, an attacker reprograms a mobile device using the hardware address of a legitimate user. The address can be 
easily stolen by intercepting the management messages during initial network entry procedures. In a rogue BS attack 
the attacker sends messages to the MU and forces it to believe that it is connected to a BS. The attacker can then 
receive all the messages from the MU. This rogue BS attack is partially solved by replacing the older version of 
PKM protocol with a newer version but the system is still susceptible to attacks. These attacks are possible mostly in 
public environment like airport, malls, etc.      
 
 
3.3 Vulnerabilities in Connection based Security Protocols 
4G technologies (WIMAX, LTE) are All-IP based networks and hence healthcare businesses and applications 
may use standard connection based security protocols [7] like HTTPS, SSL (Secure Socket layer) and TLS 
(Transaction Layer Security). Health information acts in almost all countries require use of these security protocols. 
In USA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) mention SSL to be a minimum 
requirement for all Internet-facing systems which manage electronic patient healthcare information (EPHI) in any 
form. Connection-based security protocols demand reliable communication and continuous network connectivity 
which cannot be guaranteed in mobile environment. The basic idea is to secure communication channels and hence, 
secure everything that passes through those channels. This approach has several problems. Direct connection 
between client and server must be established. If an application has multiple intermediaries to provide value-added 
services, multiple HTTPS connections must be piped together. That not only opens potential security holes at 
connecting nodes, but also makes public key certificate management extremely difficult. This problem may be 
severe in current scenario where users have intermediaries to either inter-operate between WiMAX and 3G or 
perform interworking between 4G technologies (WiMAX and LTE). EMR and EHR access over 4G networks may 
be seriously compromised. Electronic prescription systems using SSL and public key certificates will be extremely 
vulnerable. A major loophole in the SSL encrypted transmission is that the network proxies are not capable of 
scanning the encrypted SSL contents. Thus, the content is secure from eavesdropping but there is no way to assure 
that the content is not malicious. For sensitive medical data transmission like EMR, EHR and electronic 
prescriptions over 4G network, we must secure content rather than securing only channels. 
 
 
3.4 Vulnerabilities in 4G Mobile Devices 
The protocol stack in Mobile WiMAX is loaded with heavyweight and resource intensive algorithms that do not 
take into account the limitations of a mobile handheld device. Limitations in handheld and cell phone hardware can 
lead to new threats that are not present in PC and servers. Some of these are caused by a general lack of processing 
power associated with handheld mobile devices. An example of a security threat associated with limited processing 
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power is the decision to leave data in plaintext, rather than encrypting it. This can arise when the algorithm to 
perform some kinds of encryption is processor-intensive. A single encryption or decryption operation on a desktop 
might take only a few seconds, the same operation on a low-powered mobile device with a relatively weaker 
processor might take several minutes. Most cell phone and tablet users seldom employ security mechanisms built 
into a device and apply settings that can be easily determined or bypassed. Instant messaging and multimedia 
services supported on many phones are means of malware delivery. Unauthorized person may pretend to be a doctor 
and send text resulting in installation of malwares. 
 
4. Context Aware Security Scheme for Health Records  
The shortcomings mentioned in the traditional security technologies discussed above indicates that there is a need 
to enhance the security features of Mobile WiMAX to make it useful for transmission of health data. We argue that 
a security scheme which uses minimal user input and transparent to users is relatively more robust and less resource 
intensive.  In our on-going work, we propose to use context information like Location Coordinates (Longitude - Lo 
and Latitude - La) of the mobile unit and time to develop a highly reliable security and authentication scheme. We 
create a secured identity called “Location Signature (LS)” for a user request. LS is a 2-tuple record consisting of 
Lo/La and time (T) of transaction. A LS record is created continuously in real time and added to a chain of LS 
records. This chain of LS records is used for security and authentication of the legitimate user. 
 
4.1 Motivation for using Location Information as a Security Feature in Mobile WiMAX 
 
We are the first to introduce the concept of LS for developing a security and authentication scheme [6].  Our 
motivation for using LS to develop a robust security and authentication mechanism is based on the following 
assertions: 
• LS create a unique identity of a mobile user. This is based on the fact that the combined context information of 
location (Lo/La) and time is always unique for any user. This secured identity is the fundamental component of 
our scheme that is used to authenticate a legitimate user. For a malicious user, it is almost impossible to imitate 
this secured identity. 
• It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to hack LS. 
• Location identity of a mobile device adds a new dimension to mobile WiMAX security. It can supplement or 
complement existing security mechanisms. The LS can be used as a security mechanism when other systems 
have been compromised because it will always be unique for a user at any point in time. We illustrate why it is 
extremely hard to forge Lo/La which is the core component of our LS scheme.  
 
4.2 Why Lo/La cannot be easily forged?  
 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver of the mobile device receives Lo/La in the form of strings. The 
hardware interface for GPS units is designed to meet the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) 
requirements. This data includes PVT (position, velocity, time) computed by the GPS. The idea of NMEA strings is 
to send a line of data called a Sentence which is totally self contained and independent from other sentences. There 
are standard sentences for each device category and proprietary sentences can be defined for use by the individual 




This sentence has other information including 4807.038, N = La 48 deg 07.038' N and 01131.000, E =Lo 11 deg 
31.000' E.  After receiving the strings from the satellite, Lo/La is parsed out and sent to a server for the required 
application to work. To access this location information in java based MUs, a java application called MIDlet has to 
be loaded into the mobile device. A MIDlet is downloaded from a web server by a process called Over the Air 
(OTA) provisioning.  The MIDlet java archive (Jar) file which uses the standard Application Program Interfaces 
(APIs) are developed and provided by the industry leaders like Java Community Process (JCP), Qualcomm Inc., etc. 
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The Jar files are accessed by another java file called the Java Application Descriptor (Jad) file that contains all the 
information about the jar files of the MIDlet. To access jar files present in the web server, the Jad file has to be 
signed with a Digital Signature which is provided by the mobile service provider. Thus, only those mobile 
applications which are digitally signed and present in the mobile device may access Lo/La for further usage. This 
totally prevents unauthorized access to Lo/La.  Similar security features to prevent access of location information is 
present in other mobile platforms like Android, Apple OS etc. As a result Lo/La cannot be forged by a malicious 
user. Future work in this research project includes development of algorithms to implement this scheme and 
evaluate it in a mobile broadband environment to transmit mobile health data.  
5. Conclusion  
MHM is one of most important applications that are being implemented using the upcoming mobile broadband 
networks like WiMAX and LTE. An important aspect of MHM is secured transfer of mobile health data or records. 
In this work, we have identified several security threats and vulnerabilities associated with the transmission of the 
EHR, EMR and physiological data that is collected using a MBAN. To address these threats, we have proposed a 
context aware authentication scheme that uses location and time information of the MU. In our future work, we aim 
to implement this scheme and evaluate its performance during health data/records transmission in mobile broadband 
environment.      
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